（照片来源于网络）
主讲人：沈煌南 伦敦大学亚非学院发展经济学博士候选人
主持人：周晔馨 北京师范大学经济与资源管理研究院副教授
时间：2018年5月29日（星期二）12:00-13:30
地点：后主楼1710会议室
主讲人介绍：
沈煌南，伦敦大学亚非学院发展经济学博士候选人，伦敦政治经济学院经济管理硕士。现任伦敦大学亚非学院管理经济学、计量经济学、公司金融及金融策略等课程助教。研究领域为发展经济学、国际贸易、产业组织及组织经济学。曾获得伦敦政治经济学院管理系管理经济学最佳考试奖（department prize in managerial economics）、伦敦政经全校高等数学最佳考试奖及伦敦大学亚非学院科研奖学金。他近年来主要用博弈论、契约理论及产业组织的方法研究中国大型国有企业改革，是清华大学中国现代国有企业研究院中国国有企业研究课题小组成员。他还担任“Modern Management Forum”期刊编委。迄今在Fudan Journal of Humanity and Social Science ，LSE economic history working series和 SOAS Economics Working Series等处发表多篇论文。
内容提要:
This paper investigates the firm-level division of the gains in the global supply chain and provides a new theoretical framework to explain how gains are divided among firms and interdependent nations within the chain. It constructs an economic model using a bilateral monopoly market structure to analyse how the average profitability varies with the stages in the chain. By introducing a vertical restraint known as quantity fixing, the double marginalization problem arising as a result of bilateral monopoly can be resolved. It demonstrates joint-profit maximizing contracts emerge under quantity fixing parameters whereby the Assembly and downstream retailer eliminate the incentives for vertical integration.
This paper also shows the downstream retailer is more profitable than the upstream retailer if (and only if) both the capability and cost effect of Retailer dominates the two counterpart effects of Manufacturer. For the dominance of capability effect, the retailer must have higher monoposonistic market power in the intermediate inputs market than in the final goods market where it acts as a monopolist. As a result, it could extract more surplus from manufacturer rather than consumers. In terms of cost effect, the factor endowment structure differentials are important to the model. The labour intensive nature of the Manufacturer would lead it to the lower average product of labour, generating a lower level of profitability compared with upstream Retailer which is more capital intensive with higher average labour productivity. Extend it to a quantitative framework, the theories generated by this paper are broadly consistent with the data.
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